找微观经济补习老师

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近期有考试需要人辅导， 有老师的sample question， 要求教会我做sample question的问题。 每小时20刀

Example：

Ordinary Goods

1. Let U(, ) = , MU_x = , MU_y = , P_x = 6, P_y = 3, and M = 30.

2.Let U(, ) = , MU_x = , MU_y = , P_x = 6, P_y = 3, and M = 30.

3. Let U(, ) = , MU_x = , MU_y = , P_x = 6, P_y = 3, and M = 30.

4. Let U(, ) = , MU_x = , MU_y = , P_x = 6, P_y = 3, and M = 30.

5. Let U(, ) = , MU_x = , MU_y = , P_x = 6, P_y = 3, and M = 30.

a) What is the equilibrium levels of X, Y, and U? Denote this point as A.

b) Suppose now, P_y = 3. What is the new equilibrium levels of X, Y, and U? Denote this point as C.
c) Determine point B, where the individual is hypothetically given more income to compensate for the change in price levels, but is consuming the same utility as point A. (Hint: use the optimal relationship with the new price level and substitute it into the utility of the initial equilibrium.)
d) Clearly illustrate point A, B, and C on the graph and accurately label everything.

1. If the USA and the USSR bomb each other with nuclear weapons, the world comes to an abrupt and fiery end, represented by -200 on the payoff matrix. If only one country bombs the other one, the disaster is localized and the lack of retaliation means that the victim only loses 100, whereas the bomber gets p. If nobody nukes anybody, they both get zero.
   1. Suppose p is zero. Find the Nash equilibria of this game.
   2. Suppose p is any negative number. Are the Nash equilibria the same as in (a)?
   3. Suppose p is any positive number. Are the Nash equilibria the same as in (a)?

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